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Library Ranks Low
In State, National Studies

By Mike "Evans

ll
SBA Votes To Fund
ThreeStudent Groups
Three student groups seeking
re-funding for the current academic
year were voted a budget of
approximately $1500 each at the
November 8 meeting of the SBA.
Roughly half of ' the budgets will
go to projects and representation
at conventions, the other half to
be consummed by operating expenses.
After voting itself a budget of
$12,000, half of which will go to
the Speakers Program and $4000 of
which is earmarked for rental of
the various basement offices, the
SBA allocated $1,535 to the Black
American Law Students Association.
The greup's Law Day receives a
$75 grant, and a yet-unnamed
student project will take $250.
The National Lawyers Guild's $1515
budget shows two project allocations.
One, at $350, will fund a handbook,
currently being prepared, which will
outline for the layperson the state
law on divorce and voluntary
dissolution of marriage, with the
hope of enabling people to avoid
burdensome attorney's fees. The
Guild is working in conjunction
with Cleveland Women's Counseling,
and with adjunct faculty member
Susan Stauffer, who is director
of the Cleveland Legal Aid's domestic
relations division.
(See page 9)

Last issue the consequences of the
$78,000 cut in the requested budget
for Cleveland-Marshall's library were
presented. A more detailed and
revised list of what the library has
already lost is now available: 120 out
of the library's 170 serials have been
cancelled, consisting mostly of looseleaf services and mono graphs; 20 state
codes have been cancelled; duplicate
copies of 50 law reviews have been
cancelled; all encyclopedias, ALR
systems and Federal statutes have
been cut from two to one copies; the
Na tional Reporter system has been cut
from t hree to two copies; and the
library is open 13 fewer hours this
year than last. These losses just
add insult to injury in the case of
Clevelsnd-Marshall, whose largest
detriment is the inadequacy of its
library.
Where Cleveland-Marshall stands
nationally is best illustrated by
the comparative library statistics as
of July 1, 1974, compiled by the
Association of American Law Schools
for its 126 member schools. ClevelandMar shall ranked 20 of 126 in student
body size but 122 of 126 in total
volumes per student.
It ranked 47
of 126 in faculty size but 123 of
126 in total volumes per faculty
member. It ranked 101 of 126 in
total volumes and 100 of 125 in
students per library staff.

A look at the results of a table
published in the ABA publication Law
and Learning and recently reprinted in
the Student Lawyer gives another view
of where Cleveland-Marshall stands
in the law school rankings. The table
was compiled from data published in
the 1974-75 "ABA Review of Legal
Education." Six categories were
assigned a point value from one to
eight from which a total score was
determined. The lower the score,
the better the school's resources.
The categories considered were the
number of students (C-M scored in
group 1), student/volume ratio
(C-M, 8) student/faculty ratio
(c-M, 7) number of faculty (C-M, 2),
faculty , rolume ratio (C-M, 8), and
volumes in library (C-M, 3).
Cleveland-Marshall's total score was
29. The highest score was 14 and
the lowest 41.
Out of t h e 130 schools included in
t he survey , Cleveland-Marshall
ranked below 74 schools, in the same
group as 15, and received a better
score than 41.
However, compared
t o the o t h er law schools in Ohio,
Cleveland- Ma rshall came out only
above Capital, which scored a 31.
C- M v. Other Ohio Law Schools

The results of the study depended
greatly on the size of a law school's
library which in turn, depends on
the amount of money it has to spend.
(See page 8)

Ramsey Clark To Speak On Law And Social Change
Former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey Clark, who's resume reads
like a history of the civil rights
movement, will speak here this
Tuesday, November 25, at noon in the
student lounge.
His subject will be "The Law: An
Effective Instrument for Social
Change." The lecture is free and
open to the public.
Clark servetl in the Justice Department under the Kennedy and early
Johnson administrations, and was
the Attorney General from 1967-69.
Issues upon which he has focused
his efforts, and concerning which he
has consistently taken reformist
positions, have included: desegregation
and housing discrimination litigation,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, prosecution
of police in killing and brutality
cases, wiretapping restraint and
disclosure, antitrust suits for anticompetitive practices and mergers,
and federal gun control.
Since returning to private practice,
his clients have included Philip
Berrigan in the Harrisburg trial,
Ruchell Magee in the Marin County
Courthouse murder-kidnapping indictment, and Charles Pernasalice in the

Attica prison prosecutions. Clark
also travelled to North Vietnam,
where he examined the results of
American bombing and visited U.S.
P.O.W. 's.
The lecture is part of the SBA
Speakers Program.
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Famous In The Neighborhood
Famous in the neighborhood

Sunshine 1n 0hio
Perhaps the most encompassing
Sunshine Law in the country takes
legal effect in Ohio this Friday.
The Act, which by its terms
requires a liberal construction of
its provisions, is a long step on
the way to bringing the operations
of state decision-making bodies out
into the open. It affirms the
principle that the people do not,
simply by electing government
representatives, abdicate their
right to personally witness or be
informed about the deliberations
of state legislatures, commissions,
agencies or institutions.
Not the least of such "institutions"
is this law school. Just as the
university's board of trustees -has
already opened its meetings to the
public in response to the new Act,
this faculty, the "decision-making
body" of this school, will assumedly
open its meetings to the public
gaze. Recent debate among them
indicates they expect to abide
by the new law.
The next meeting of the faculty
is December 12 at 3:00 p.m.,in
room 2062. We will be there. We
suggest you exercise your new
right, and join us.

••

stripped

Among children and dogs

By its competition from the Pentagon

And al I I iving things hidden

Pollution is reaching eel ipse proportion

I walk about talking nonsense

We are left muttering to ourselves

lnhal ing through the ears energy

Traditional graffiti

Puttin g humor on the mouth showing teeth

And pity poor protest

In the street I run amuck

Bound.

Having learned in my quest

Mediocrity sits in the judgment seat

For ma x imum security

The mad bombers are on the way

A flair for fair play

... yet, the rain falls, the grass is wet

Eve rything, truly, amazes me

The robin eats the worm

How people get up, go to work

The voices of children are heard from

How they get through the day

Gagged.

Held in contempt

the turtle

Without breaking down

In the sandbox in the park

How at night they sleep so sound

As the sun, sti I I famous in my neighbor-

Ah, citizens, shopkeepers, servants of
the law
This is, indeed, an age of obscenities
Th e four-letter word has long been o ut-

hood
Shines its shoes and walks through the
sky
-Daniel Thompson

Letters to the Editor
To the Editor:
Being a past editor of The Gavel,
I try to read each issue of the newspaper. In the November 6, 1975 issue
I read a news story (page 3) and an
editorial (page 2) which dealt with
the request made by students to
convene a faculty-student committee
to investigate Professor Sonenfield's
competence to teach.
Any CSU law student who proposes
that Professor Sonenfield is
incompetent to teach in law school
belongs to a protected class of
individuals defined in the Department of Labor's Regulations issued
under Section 503 of Public Law
93-112, viz., mentally handicapped
persons.
If you really want to know the
truth, that phony student request
would depress the hell out of
Holden Caulfield. I swear, it really
would.
Lila Daum Anderson '73
Editor-in-Chief of The Gavel
1972-1973
To the Editor:
It is time to bring the
"Sonenfield Affair" to an end! At
this time, the administration is
awaiting an opinion from the
University Attorney with respect to
the jurisdiction of the Dean's

Faculty Advisory Council to hold
a hearing on the matter. We feel
a presentation of the facts and
circumstances leading up to the
present situation is in order.
First, the facts have been
distorted beyond belief by the
emotionally charged and erroneous
reporting of the original memo and
the subsequent events. Prof.
Sonenfield's memo to Dean Messerman
requested that she:
" . • . use her efforts to
reduce to the extent
possible the assignment of
students in the LCOP program
to the two sections of
Property" (which he currently
teaches.
He gave the following reason for the
request:
"The academic results of most
of those whom I have taught
in the past have been
satisfactory neither for them
nor for me. I desire to avoid,
to the extent that I can
possibly do so, any further
unhappiness on either their
part or mine and I think that
it is better for the program
if I do not have the
responsibility to teach or
grade them."
Dean Messerman informed Prof.
Sonenfield of the administration's
"non-transferability of sections"
policy. He communicated his understanding and respect for this

administration policy and said he
would make no further requests.
The record is quite clear. Prof.
Sonenfield has never refused to teach
any students, whether minority, LCOP,
or BALSA. In fact, it is one of his
great characteristics that he treats
all persons with the greatest of
respect.
Second, on October 6, BALSA demande
Prof. Sonenfield's resignation. By
their own admission, the students
representing BALSA had not read the
memorandum when they made their demand
It seems incredible that law
students would engage in such public
defamation of character without
having even checked the facts.
Third, under the previous
administration, first year LCOP
students were given individual treatment in class assignment. They were
either assigned at their own request
to certain pref erred professors or
allowed to transfer to other
professors of their choice. As a
result, few LCOP students were place~
in Prof. Sonenfield's Property
classes in the past three years.
A more appropriate interpretatior
of his memo would be that Prof.
Sonenfield was seeking a
continuation of the policies that
had benefited LCOP students in the
past. Far from seeking a termination
of the program, he indicated the
reason for the request was that:
" • • • it is better for
the program. • • ". (See page 9)

Harllel Jones--ls he in Lucasville for aidinie
and abetting in murder, or for politics?
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By Gary Kelder

Friend:
Harllel B. Jones (Harllel X) has
~pent nearly four years in Ohio prisons
for a crime he didn't commit. With
your help, he may soon be free.
Harllel Jones is a black man.
He's 37 years old, married, and the
father of two children. One March 28.
1L972 he was convicted in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas of aiding
and abetting murder in the
second degree and shooting with
intent to kill or wound. A life
sentence was imposed.
Last year, as you may recall, the
~ommutation of Harllel's sentence
was considered by the Ohio Adult
Dear
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Parole Authority and the Governor.
Commutation is defined in O.R.C.
~967.01 (C).
Simply stated, it
~eans that the sentence is reduced
to time served. Commutation is authorLzed when "there is reasonable ground
~ o believe that ••• it would further the
~~terests of justice and be consistent
~ ith the welfare and security of
society," O.R.C. 2967.03. Innocence
qualifies - even apparent innocence
~ualifies.
Harllel Jones qualifies.
~t any rate, the parole authority
did not favor commutation, and
departing Governor Gilligan, although
acknowledging that it was a close
~ ase, went along.
The Governor did,
however, direct that Harllel' s case
be automatically reconsidered this
year.
So the parole authority is
?resently conducting an investigation
,f Harllel's case. Soon (in
either December or January) it will be
forwarding its recommendation to
;overnor Rhodes.
In the meantime, the ACLU of Greater
Cleveland, acting together with
Harllel's family and friends, has embarked upon a campaign to enlist comaunity support for the commutation of
I·
Harllel's sentence. I am asking you
to assist that effort by registering
your personal or group support. As
members of Cleveland's legal community,
your voices will be meaningfully heard.
For the same reason, your voices
.:>qould be heard.
You're not being asked to support
Harllel Jones' release because he is a
f i ne person and an asset to the Cleveland community. These things are true,
but you perhaps have no way of knowing
that from personal knowledge. You' re
being asked to support Harllel Jones

The author is the attorney for
Harllel Jones, and will represent him
in a federal habeus corpus hearing
recently granted by Frank Battisti,
·chief Judge of the U.S. District Court
here. Kelder is presently teaching law
at the University of Syracuse, after
three years on the Cleveland-Marshall
faculty.

judgment will be. Let me tell you why.
because, as lawyers, future lawyers,
and educators in the law, you are,
perhaps moreso than others, in a
position to render impartial judgment
on the facts relevant to the manner
in which Harllel Jones was convicted.
I have no doubt as to what that
Up to this point I have told you
little about Harllel Jones. If I
told you no more, I would be seriously
remiss, for to fully understand why
Harllel Jones must be freed, it is
helpful, if not necessary, to know
why Harllel Jones was chosen for his
role in one of the most vicious
prosecutions that this community has
witnessed. You should know that
Harllel Jones gained prominence in
the Cleveland community in the
latter part of the 1960's as the
Prime Minister of the Afro-Set - an
organization which counselled that
pride, courage, discipline, unific ation,
self-defense and community control of
community businesses and institutions
were the means of overcoming the
yoke and brutality of racial and
economic depression. You should note
too, that in addition to mere
prominence, Harllel Jones gained
the respect of Cleveland's black
community. You should be aware that
he gained that respect, not as a
comptroller of establishment largesse,
and not as a rhetoritician who set
himself up as a leader, but because
he exercised leadership in his
community and among its members - as
a professor of progressive restraint

persons, and utility service persons,
and that he is attributed with having
impacted upon local crime when the
police could not. He was a true leader
in the struggle for liberation. Consequently, he was a threat. In turn, he
became a target of oppression - the
chosen subject of a sham prosecution.
Now I sense that many of you are
experiencing difficulty in following
me to this conclusion. But be
patient and listen further. You
are perhaps thinking how was Harllel
Jones a threat? What was there to
fear from him? And how can it
reasonably be said that it was Harllel
Jones' political (not criminal)
activity which prompted his
conviction and incarceration? In a
way I am at a loss in answering
these questions, because limitations
of space and considerations of
relevancy prevent me from addressing
what is perhaps (for some of you) the
princip al thrust of these questions i.e., was Harllel Jones really a
threat and was he really to be feared?
I can only tell you that in July 1970
Harllel Jones was named as one of
seven major "enemies" of Cleveland
law enforcement by the then safety
director. I can tell you that since
early in 1968 Harllel Jones has
been the target of extensive and
continual secret service surveillance.
I can tell you that the secret service
was aided in its surveillance by
the F.B.I. I can tell you that in
August of 19 67, f ormer F.B.I. director
Hoover instituted a Counterintelligence

and as a partition against official
onslaught on the streets in Hough
in 1966 and Glenville in 1968; as a
moving force in the Cleveland Council
of Churches; as chairperson of the
Poor People's Partnership; and in
Cleveland's Headstart program. It
should be brought to your attention
that Harllel Jones is attributed
with having aided in making his
community safe for businesses, fire-

program (COINTELPRO) which was
designed and intended to "expose,
disrupt, misdirect, discredit or
otherwise neutralize black nation·alist • • . organizations, their
leadership, spokesman, membership and
supporters". I can tell you that
the F.B.I. program was concerned
with activity that fell far short
of crime. I can tell you that the
F.B.I. director instructed regional
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offices to the effect that "in unity
there is strength; a truism that is
no les~ valid for all its triteness", and that "an effective
coalition of black nationalist
groups might be the first step toward
the beginning of a true black
revolution". I can tell you that
Harllel Jones was the subject of
COINTELPRO. I can tell you that
F.B.I. agents were extensively
involved in Harllel's prosecution,
notwithstanding the fact that no
possible federal crime was involved.
In short, I can tell you with
positive assurance that Harllel Jones
was perceived as a threat, that he
was feared, and that he was a likely
candidate for malicious prosecution.
I could go further, less assuringly,
perhaps, and explain why Harllel Jones
was really a threat and why his
political activity caused him to be
feared. But that shouldn't be
necessary. In the past, we have
all shared a naivete when it comes
to underst&nding the machinations of
power and the etiology of oppression.
But we are wiser today - especially
in the wake of Watergate and recent
disclosures about the CIA, the F.B.I.
and many others.We have learned to
be vigilant in not underestimating
the force of fear - be it rational
or irrational. We no longer cling to
the notion or belief (some never did)
that the clear and present danger
doctrine is an operational restraint
upon governmental harassment,
surveillance and suppression of
political dissent. We are not without
answers when asked why Richard Nixon
imperiled constitutional order and
liberty when he had the 1972 election
sewed up. Having learned these
things at the very least we cannot
casually and lightly dismiss the
assertion that Harllel Jones was
prosecuted and imprisoned for activity
other than that which would constitute
a crime.
So bear with me further
and let me now tell you how it was
done.

Essentially, a criminal prosecution
is a search for the truth, the
discovery of which will determine
whether a person is to be free or
imprisoned. It is no wonder, then, that
the Supremem Court has held that the
"deliberate deception of a court
and jurors by the presentation of
known false evidence is incompatible
with rudimentary demands of justice;"
that "the same result obtains when
the state, although not soliciting
false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears;" that

..
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this rule "does not cease to apply
merely because the false testimony
foes only to the credibility of the
witness." (Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959)).
It is equally no wonder that the
Supreme Court has held "that the
suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to the accused upon
request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." (Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963)). And it should

come as no surprise that the ~upreme
Court has cautioned prosecutors that
a criminal prosecution is not a game
to be won or lost and that, while
they are free to strike hard blows,
they must resist the temptation to
strike foul blows. I ask you to
keep these well settled propositions
of law in mind as I recount for you
the relevant facts of Harllel Jones'
case. I ask you to judge whether
the prosecution of Harllel Jones
qualifies as a search for the truth
and whether it can fairly be said
that the truth was discovered. I
ask you to determine if Harllel
Jones was the recipient of foul
blows.
On the evening of August 6, 1970,
a member of the Afro-Set, one Willie
Lofton, was killed by a security
guard at a McDonald's restaurant in
Cleveland. The event provoked
outrage in the community, and at the
behest of the restaurant's owner,
Harllel Jones appeared at the scene
and calmed the crowd which had
angrily gathered. His presence was
attributed with having prevented
further violence. But the peace was
short-lived. In the early morning
hours of August 7, 1970, four members
of the Afro-Set occupied an automobile which was proceeding along the
streets of downtown Cleveland. The
driver and owner of the vehicle was
one Marvin Bobo. Sitting next to
him in the front seat was a man
named Robert Perry. The back seat
was occupied by James Moore and
Victor Harvey. Harvey was fifteen
years old. According to the testimony
at Harllel's trial, these men were
bent upon exacting retribution for
the killing of Willie Lofton. So
by their actions, a citizen of
Cleveland was shot and killed while he
was riding home. Another man was
wounded. According to the trial
testimony, all of the vehicles'
occupants were armed. Bobo, however,
was said to have been responsible
for the fatal shooting, while Perry
was noted to have been responsible
for the wounding. As a practical
matter, all were equally responsible,
given established principals of
complicity liability.
A year later, in October 1971,
Harllel Jones was indicted for these
shootings. The charge was murder
in the first degree and shooting with
intent to kill or wound. Perry, Bobo,
Moore and Harvey were similarly

charged. All were arrested and
detained. In the indictment it was
alleged that after the incident at
McDonald's Harllel called a meeting
at which he gave an order to
retaliate. It was further alleged
that the shootings occurred pursuant
to that order. Hence, Harllel was
to be prosecuted as an aider and
abettor, the others as principals.
The trial did .not commence until
March of 1972. However, during the
intervening five months, several
things happened which roust be
mentioned. For instance, the AssistaD
County P~osecutors, who were assigned
to the case, moved for a joint trial.
Under Ohio law, persons jointly
indicted for a capital offense must
be tried separately, except upon
motion by the prosecutor shewing good
cause for a joint trial (ORC 2945.20
and Criminal Rule 14). Joint trials
under such circumstances are rare
because of the gravity of the offense
and the need to avoid possible
prejudice. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor's motion was granted. On
the matter of prejudice, the prosecute
in support of the motion, asserted
that the state did not intend to use
statements obtained f.rom any of the
co-def en<lants during custodial
interro3ation. !1.emer1ber that.
It s lioulc'. c.lso be noted that after
:1e was arrested i:i October , 1971,
.~rvey (by t ~2n l G yec.rs ol<l) was
interrozate<l by Cleveland homiciJe
uetec tives. Touard t ;1e ead of
October, 1971, and upon t~ e
recor:u:!endation of t i1c prosecutor, all
cl-:ar:;es azainst ~:arvey were disuisse<l
.:mJ he \las cleclareJ a naterial witness>
for the state. Tl1.ese r.1a tters i;.;ere
wi~ely publicized and it appeared
that Harvey was to be a state witness.
Then, in January, 1972, Harvey was
interviewed by an investigator who
had bee.fi assigned to Harllel's defense
During the interview, Harvey told the
investigator that when he was
questioned by the police, he was
asked if Harllel called a meeting,
and he said no. He said he was
asked if Harllel ordered the shootings
and he said no. Now things looked
different. Armed with this information, Harllel's trial attorneys
filed a pre-trial motion asking for
the disclosure of Harvey's statement,
under Brady v. Maryland. They
claimed that the statement was
favorable to Harllel Jones, and
material to the issue of guilt. The
prosecutor acknowledged that Harvey
had been questioned, but denied that
Harvey provided a statement which
exculpated Harllel Jones. So things
were back where they started.
Finally I should point out that
'
prior to the
commencement of Harllel I s
trial, both Moore and Bobo plead
guilty to murder in the second degree.
Another co-defendant (who was
charged as an aider and abettor and
who I did not mention previously)
waived trial by jury and his case
was severed from Harllel's. Since
the charges against Harvey had been
dismissed, that left only Harllel
and Robert Perry. Now just prior
to jury selection, Harllel's defense
attorney reiterated his opposition
to a joint trial. Harllel's attorney
had come to believe that Perry would
be the state's witness at trial
(at one of the sessions, where the
attorneys for all the defendants met
to discuss the case, Perry's attorney
stated that it was not necessary
for him to prepare a defense). The
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rial judge was therefore told
hat it would constitute a "sham" to
continue with the joint trial. In
response, the prosecutor was. according
to the Court of _Appeals, "evasive."
He said that he didn't have to disclose
~ho h is witnesses would be.
So the
trial started. The prospective
jurors were ass embled. Harllel and
Perry were introduced to them as
defendants and voir dire ensued', with
Perry's counsel participating. Af ter
' ,1proximately 24 jurors we re examined,
i 2rry waived a jury t r ial and hi s
case was severed. Now Harllel Jones
stood alone.
At the trial, the prosecution's
key witness was Robert Perry . He
was the only witness, during the
prosecution's cas e in chief, who
supplied evidence linking Harll e l
Jones to the cr ime s . Without Perry,
a motion to dismiss wa s a certainty ,
and the case would never hav e reached
the jury. So his testimony was
crucial to the state, and the jury 's
estimate of his truthfulness and
reliability was determinative of
guilt or innocence. In short, it was
upon such subtle factors as Perry 's
possible interest in testifying falsely
that Harllel's life or liberty
depended .
Perry testified, in pertinent
part, as follows: that on
the evening of August 6, 1970,
Harllel called a mee ting and gave the
order to retaliate; that he (Perry)
rode in the murder car and participated
in the shootings; that he first
disclosed this information to F.B.I.
agents in Columbus, Ohio, in August
of 1971; that the provided the F.B.I.
and Cleveland police officers (one
from homicide, the other from the
Cleveland Police Intelligence Unit)
with a statement to the foregoing
effect; that thereafter he worked for
the F.B.I. on Harllel's case and
on a different case; that he was
r~imbursed by the F.B.I. for his
expenses on as many as fifteen
occasions in the total amount of
approximately $600; that, the money
aside, the F.B.I. did no favors for
him in return for his assisting
them; that he testified before the
Cuyahoga grand jury in October of
1971; that no promise of leniency
had been made to him in return for
his testimony; and that he was
told only that his testimony would
be taken into consideration in
determining what would happen with

the first degree murde r charge
which was pending against him.
Victor Harvey , who you will recall
was declared a material witness for
the state, was not called to testify
at the trial. The remaining two eye
witnesses were, of course, Moore and
Bobo. Moore declined to testify.
Bobo testified for Harllel. In his
testimony Bobo stated that it was he
who directed the retaliation and that
Harllel Jones knew nothing about it.
On March 28 , 197 2 , the jury r e turned
a v erdic t of guil t y . Har l lel wasn ' t
convicted of first degree murder, so
his life was spared. Spared? There
may be a better word. Harllel was
convicted of second degree murder and
deprived of his freedom - for life.
Up to this point I have recited

...........

Finally, you ask, did Perry lie or
misrepresent the facts when he denied
that he had been promised leniency?
When he said that his first contact
with law enforcement agents (F.B.I.
and Cleveland Police) was in August of
1971? When he said that, aside from
the money, he received no favors
from the F.E.I. In other words, was
the jury apprised of all of the
facts which had a bearing on Perry's
credibility and thus (given the
fact that Perry was the key witness)
on the truth of what had occurred?
Now, I don't propose to answer
these questions for you. You will
remember that I am seeking your
judgment; so you must answer these
questions for yourself. I can,
however, help by supplying you with
additional facts and inferences (which,
I am confident, you are able to
identify and treat accordingly) that
will aid you in your task. Let me
proceed to do this by taking your
questions in the order presented.
First - the motion for joint trial.
Did the prosecutor know when he moved
for a joint trial that Perry would
be his witness?
Well, he had no
other witness, and it was Perry who
testified before the grand jury. And
I suppose you should know that on
March 31, 1972 (three days after
Harllel was convicted) the prosecutor
stated in open court (on the record)
that without Perry noone would have
been indicted - including Harllel
Jones. Was Harllel Jones prejudiced
by the joint trial motion? By the
fact that this permitted Perry's
attorney to participate in the voir
dire? And by the fact that Perry was
consequently introduced to the
prospective jurors as a co-defendant?
Well, here you should know that certain
of the prospective jurors to whom
Perry was initially introduced
remained on the jury. I suppo s e too,
that you would be right in asking would the trial judge have granted the
joint trial motion if it had been
made known to him that Perry would
be the state's witness? Was the court

_______________________________,_...........................

"Prejudice to the case would most certainly occur when the only
remaining co- defendant , rises from the defense table and proceeds to
the side of the s tate and then commences to tel l the j ury , implicitly
but with unmis takable impact, that a plea of not guilty and the

________ --------------------·······

presumption of innocence ar e r ather meaningle s s as sumptions ."

-

.................. ...........,_,,,

__

,

c ertain basic reco r d facts which have
relevance to t he legal principals that
I asked yQu to bear in mind. If you
have followed me this far, you are
full of questions. You ask, for
example: Since the prosecutor must
have known that Perry would be the
state's witness (after all, Perry
supplied a statement in August of 1971
and he testified before the grand jury
in October 1971) was it proper to
move for joint trial of Perry and
Harllel Jones? Was it proper for him
t o allow Perry's attorneys to
participate in group sessions? Was
it proper for him to allow Perry to
be introduced to the prospective
jurors as a co-defendant? Was it
proper for him to have permitted
Perry's attorney to participate in
voir dire? Could this have prejudiced
Harllel's right to a fair trial?
Was this a foul blow? You also ask:
What did Harvey tell the police about
Harllel when he was interrogated?
Did he really tell them that Harllel
was not involved? And if so, was
that information, so important to
the determination of the truth,
suppressed by the prosecutor when it
was requested by Harllel's attorneys?

deceived? You should also know that
the voir dire stage is somewhat
preoccupied with informing the
prospective jurors that defendants
are presumed innocent, having plead
not guilty, and that the prosecution
bears the heavy burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, I suppose you should know
what any experienced criminal defense
attorney knows - that the time-honored
presumption of innocence occupies a
precarious station in the day to day
conduct of criminal trials and that
prejudice to the case of his client
would most certainly occur, by
reason of the devastation of this
presumption as well as the corollary
and equally elusive concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, when the
only remaining co-defendant, who
like his client is cloaked with the
presumption due to a plea of not
guilty, rises from the defense table
and proceeds to the side of the state
and then commences to tell the jury,
implicitly but with unmistakable
impact, that a plea of not guilty
and the presumption of innocence
are rather meaningless assertions .
You must decide. Was this a foul blow?
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consider what I have just related to
you
along with the following. First,
"The Afro- Set lawyer was dazzled. He thought that he must
consider that when he admitted his
involvement in murder, Perry was stil
have done a great job. Now he wonders."
on probation in Columbus. His term
wasn't due to expire until November
of 1971. You can imagine that this
to marry again, that he was involved
Now, about Victor Harvey. Did
could get sort of sticky, expecially
in an automobile accident and was
Harvey provide the Cleveland police
since
Perry's probation record was
expecting a settlement with which he
with a statement which exonerated
hardly
exemplary. So in September of
would pay court costs and restitution
Harllel Jones? Well, since Harllel
1971,
Perry
went to see his probation
expenses flowing from his forgery
was convicted, Harvey has said on
officer.
According
to the probation
conviction, and that he wanted to
two occasions (in affidavits) that he
officer,
at
this
meeting
Perry
come back to Columbus. The Cleveland
did. And you should know that the
experienced
difficulty
in
explaining
attorney who was handling Perry's
investigation conducted on Harllel's
that
he
was
involved
"in
important
accident claim also called the
behalf has revealed an eye witness who
work for the government, primarily
probation department to corroborate
corroborates Harvey's account. Did
in the Cleveland, Ohio area." So he
Perry's
account.
the prosecutor know? The prosecutor
left and came back with an F.B.I.
Perry seemed unconcerned. Together,
acknowledge in open court that Harvey
agent who told the probation officer
the Columbus attorney and Perry then
was interrogated. And he knew by whom
that Perry "was doing some special
paid
a
visit
to
Perry's
probation
Harvey was interrogated. Furthermore,
work for his agency within the Afroofficer.
It
was
a
short
visit.
The
the Cleveland homicide detectives who
Set in Cleveland and in Columbus".
result - Perry was told that everyquestioned Harvey were extensively
But
what was the purpose for the call
thing was okay and that he could return
involved in the case; their presence
Well,
the F.B.I. agent requested that
to Columbus. The warrant was withwas observed on numerous occasions
Perry's
probation status be continued
drawn. So was the order of suspension,
in the courtroom at the trial. And
until
the
completion of his assignand no extended term of probation was
wasn't Harvey the prosecutor's material
ment.
Now
- you are asking. wasn't
imposed. The Afro-Set's lawyer was
witness? Now you decide. Was the truth
this
a
state
case? So why was Perry
dazzled. He thought that he must
suppressed?
on
an
F.B.I.
assignment?
If Perry's
have done a great job. Now he wonders.
That brings me to Robert Perry.
first
contact
with
the
F.B.I.
was in
Perry never told him about the prior
There's alot that you should know about
August, 1971, why did he say that
Perry. Let me start back in 1968. Perry
he was doing important governmental
was then living in Columbus, Ohio, and
work "primarily" in Cleveland? In
he was not exactly a law-abiding citizen.
a period of one month, could he have
He was charged with assault and
bee~ on assignment someplace else
battery on his wife and torturing his
also? And if Perry just came in off
child (the record would seem to
the street and spilled the beans,
indicate that these charges were
why did the F.B.I. agent say that
dismissed, in part because . . • ); he
Perry was working "within" the Afrowas convicted of forgery (a felony) in
Set? And didn't the agent say within
1968 and placed on probation under the
the Afro-Set in Columbus, too? These
supervision of the adult probation
are good questions, and I'm glad to s
you're still with me. So read on,
department for Franklin County. While
read on.
living in Columbus and while on
Perry was indicted with everyone
probation, Perry became a member of the
else in October of 1971. After that,
Afro-Set chapter there. At Harllel's
and still in October, 1971, two F.B.I.
trial, he said that he "investigated"
agents paid a visit to the Chief of
the Afro-Set before he joined.(?)
the Probation Department in Columbus,
In the spring of 1970, Perry's
Ohio. They told the chief that
probation officer was informed that
Perry was their informant or plant who
Perry was involved with black militants
1
had infiltrated a black militant
in Columbus and that he was carrying a
organization in Cleveland. Informant
weapon. This information was supplied
Plant? Infiltrated? Yes. They told
by the Columbus Police Intelligence
the chief that Perry was to be their
Unit. Shortly thereafter, around
star witness (their witness? Yes) in
April of 1970, Perry stopped showing
an upcoming trial and requested that
up for his meetings with his probation
his probation not be revoked. (Was
officer. In fact, he left Columbus
communication with the probation
that a favor?) They also requested
(without permission) and travelled to
officials from Cleveland.
that Perry's probation status be
Cleveland. In legal parlance, he
Now, according to Perry's trial
continued (remember, he was to be
absconded. When he ar.rived in
testimony, about five months after his
discharged in November 1971) so that
Cleveland, he joined the Afro-Set and
probation was restored and in August
it would appear when he testified
befriended, or was befriended by,
of 1971 he had his first contact with
that probation revocation was still
Harvin Bobo.
law enforcement agents (namely the
hanging over him. (Does that sound
Perry was told to come back to
F.B.I.) in reference to Harllel's
like a search for the truth?) The
Columbus. So he did. But before
case. This occurred in Columbus.
chief complied.
he "surrendered" himself to probation
Again, according to his testimony,
officials, Perry. called the Prime
Now, as I told you before, after
Perry is supposed to have sort of
the indictments were handed down,
Minister of the Afro-Set in
come in off the street and related
Columbus. Ile explained that he was
Perry was arrested along with everyto the agents in Columbus how he
body else who was indicted. Unlike
in trouble on his probation and asked
had participated in a killing in
everyone else, however, Perry was
for legal assistance. The Prime
Cleveland a year before and how he
Minister contacted the Afro-Set's
not confined in the Cuyahoga County
did this pursuant to an order given
lawyer in Columbus, and arranged for
Jail. Instead, he was kept in Lake
by Harllel Jones. Okay, so Perry
Perry to be interviewed. When Perry
County and Geauga County.
admitted to agents of the F.B.I. and
met with the Columbus attorney, he
Cleveland police officers that he was
I probably should also point out that
was informed of the gravity of his
involved in a murder. Was he arrested? Perry wasn't always kept in jail.
situation - i.e. that he would probably
No. Are admitted murderers usually
Remember, he had instituted a divorce
spend some time in jail until his
arrested? Well, yes, but, as Perry
proceeding. The hearing had been
story was checked out, and that quite
testified, he then started working for
rescheduled on the court's calendar
possibly his probation would be revoked.
the F.B.I. on Harllel's case and on
(Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations)
In the early morning hours of August
a "different case." He did this up
a number of times. It was finally
7, 1970, as you recall, Perry and Bobo,
until the time he was jailed in
scheduled for March 15, 1972 (a
along with Moore and Harvey, participatOctober 1971 - a period of about two
couple weeks before Perry testified).
ed in ~he killing for which Harrlel was
months. Also during this interim, Perry In fact, it was scheduled for March 15
convicted. In January of 1971, about
was supposedly reimbursed for his
1972 for a particular reason - you see
nine months after he absconded, the
"expenses" on as many as fifteen
that was the day that the homicide
Franklin County Probation Department
occasions in a total amount of
detective, who was working on
issued a warrant for Perry's arrest
approximately $600. He was pretty
Harllel's case, had off. So on that
as a probation violator . His
day, two homicide detectives escorted
busy.
probation was thereupon suspended.
Perry
from the jail to the Domestic
Now let me take a breath. Let me
Several months later, around March of
Relations
Court for the divorce
also back up a bit. You'll recall
1971, Perry called the Columbus
proceeding. Perry was represented by
that at Harllel's trial Perry said
probation officials from Cleveland. He
legal aid attorney. The proceeding
that his first contact with the
took place in chambers, and when it
told them that he had a job in CleveF.B.I. was in August of 1971, and that
was over, the judge took the matter
land, that he was instituting
aside from the money he received
divorce proceedings, that he wanted
under advisement. Then,the
no other favors from the F.B.I. Well,

·----·----···----...·---·----·-····-······-··························-····················-···-·--··----"Three days after HarUel was convicted, an admitted participant in
rrrurder, Robert Perry, was the r ecipient of a nolle prosequi entered
on his behalf to the charge of first degree murder."

·······························-··-····-·····-···-·······--··-··-----···--·-·-··-·----···-·························-··············-····of the Afro-Set in Columbus back in
detectives asked the legal aid attorney
to wait with Perry (uncuffed throughout and now unguarded) outside while
they .spoke with the judge. The attorney who was aware of the apparent jeopardy that Perry was in as
an indicted murderer and all that)
was unable to resist inquiring about
the matter of security. The response
was, as the attorney recalls, that
there was no cause for concern. Indeed. (treat my indeed as you will).
The rest you know - that is, what happened at the trial. So let's
skip over that and turn to March 31,
1972 (three days after Harllel was
convicted ) . On that day, an admitted
participant in murder, Robert Perry,
was the recipient of a nolle prosequi
entered on his behalf to the charge of
first degree murder. Pursuant to the
law,of course, the nolle was entered
by a Common Pleas Court judge upon
the recommendation of the prosecutor.
Now you must decide - is there
reasonable ground to believe that
Perry expected that treatment? Was it
arranged in advance of his testimony?
Ifso, would the jury have been aided
inassessing his credibility had they
known the truth?
Perhaps I can supply you with a few
more facts. I would point out that
Perry's probation was never revoked.
And, as you recall, the Columbus
probation officials were requested by
the F. B. I. to continue Perry's
probation status until the completion of
his assignment. You remember why?
Now consider the fact that Perrywas
finally and oficially discharged
from probation on March 24, 1972 -h¥o
days after he testified. You
might also want to know what happened
to Perry after he was
released.
Well, for awhile he
disappeared.
He surfaced in Columbus
inearly 1973. He was then charged,
by indictment, with the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon (a felony).
On March 15, 1973, Perry appeared in
the Franklin County Court of Corrunon
Pleas and plead guilty to a lesser
included offense - carrying a concealed
weapon.
He had subpoenaed witnessesto
appear on his behalf on that date.
One such witness was the Chief of the
Columbus Police Intelligence Unit.
The former chief of the Franklin
County Adult Probation Department
recalls seeing the Columbus Intelligence
Chief in the courtroom that day. He
recalls further that the Intelligence
Chief was perturbed with Perry. He
recalls too that the Intelligence
Chief explained how the F. B. I. had set
Perry up outside the State of Ohio
when he was released by Cuyahoga
County officials back in March of
1972 , and that Perry hadn't exercised
sound judgment by returning to
Columbus. He recalls finally that the Intelligence Chief indicated thathe
still felt obliged to help Perry
because of his (Perry's) prior
cooperation.
You continue to plague me
with questions. Now you ask: Why did
Perry subpoena the head of the
Columbus Intelligence Unit? Had Perry
been an informant in Columbus
too? Is that why the F.B.I. agent
told Perry's probation officer back
in September of 1971 that Perry was working
within the Afro-Set in
Cleveland
and Columbus? If so,
shouldn't the jury have been told? And if
Perry had his first contact with the
F.B.I. in August of 1971 and was
jailed two months later, how could he
have also worked as an informant in
Columbus? After all, he was a member

1970 before he absconded from
probation and even before the killing
occurred? (!!!) Then too, if Perry's
first contact with the F.B.I. on a
purely state case had been in August
of 1971, why would the F.B.I. relocate
him? Was he that important to them?
And if so, wouldn't Perry have known
this? Shouldn't the jury have know
this? Once again, your questions
are good ones. But you must decide.
I have provided you with the facts. I
ask for your judgment.
But I did forget one fact. You of
course want to know what happened to
Perry when he plead guilty to carrying
a concealed weapon. What do you
think happened? Perry had been
convicted of a felony in 1968; he
absconded from earlier probation; he
admitted participating in a murder
in Cleveland (although he was not
prosecuted) and he was charged with
a new felony and was pleading guilty
to a lesser included offense. As a
point of comparison, I would point
out that Harllel Jones has been
convicted as an adult only once, and
you are reading about that. Harllel
is, of course, confined for life. So
what do you think happened to Perry?
He was placed on probation. The judge
took into account the fact that the
pre-sentence report noted that Perry
had testified on behalf of the
prosecution on various occasions.
Various occasions? But, you say I thought Perry had only testified
against Harllel? The jury wasn't
told of any other cases in which he
testified? Indeed. But the judge
said various occasions. Any now you
must decide. Was Harllel's prosecution
a search for the truth? Was the jury
apprised of all the facts which had
a bearing on Perry's credibility?
Before closing, I would mention
that while Harllel Jones is presently
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seeking commutation, efforts to
vindicate the violation of his
constitutional rights in the courts
have not ceased. At the moment,
Harllel's case is pending in federal
court on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. His conviction is
being challenged on nine separate
grounds - only three of which have
been addressed by the foregoing.
I would further mention that Harllel
Jones has yet to receive an evidentiary
hearing on the matters which I have
related to you. Hence, some of the
preceding facts are not of record.
Rather, they are the product of an
investigation which has been
diligently conducted on Harllel's
behalf. The struggle in the courts
will go forward - it can however be
obviated if you will help - now.
At the outset I stated that Harllel
Jones has spent nearly four years in
prison for a crime he didn't corrunit.
I've tried to explain. I said with your
help, he could soon be free. I've
told you how. If you feel and if you
determine that the prosecution of
Harllel Jones was not a search for the
truth, and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the truth was
not established; and if, in your
judgment, the interest of justice
would be furthered by his release, make
your determination known to the people
at the ACLU, and they will forward it
to the Parole Board.
I realize that I have taken your time
and that I ask for even more of your
time. B~t alot is at stake. Harllel
Jones has been deprived of alot of
time, his liberty is at stake. You
may even feel that our liberty is at
stake. You'd be right.
Thank you for listening.
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(Since the Committee of lOOO is gaining in use and importance,
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Here Comes The Sun

new oliio rtatute will open
meetinyr of tlecirion-maliny /Jotlier
.,

By Bruce Wick

·'·

...

·' 1

On November 28, the so-calle<l
Sunshine Law, Amended Substitute
Senate Bill 74, takes effect,
replacing the present Section 121.22
O.R.C. The bill's purpose is to
sweep away the vestiges of secrecy
in the government. To this end,
the bill is far-reaching, comprehensive, and innovative. If the
effects of the Act are somewhat less
than hoped, this may result from the
surprisingly fragmented nature of
state government and the immunity of
the fragments to control by the
legislature.

any board
1. state agency
cormnission
OF A 2. institution,
committee, or
or
similar decision3. authority
making body

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

any legislative
authority, or
board,
OF ANY
commission,
committee,
agency,
authority, or
similar decisionmaking body

4. county
5. township
6. municipal
corp.

7. school
district
8. other
political
subdivision,
or
9. local public
institution

... Library woes

The acquisitions budgets for the four
state supported schools in Ohio for
1975-76 are: Ohio State, $157,000;
Toledo, $103,000; Akron, $100,000;
and Cleveland-Marshall, $96,000.
These figures show even more disparity
when considered in light of respective
student body size. For purposes of
comparison, a school's student body
is represented by FTE (full-time
E;quivalent), which is computed by
counting full-time students as one
and part-time (including evening)
students as 2/3. In 1974-75 Ohio
state had an FTE of 650, Toledo of
720, Akron of 461 and ClevelandMarshall of 900.
Another comparative category which
puts Cleveland-Marshall at the bottom
of the list of all Ohio schools is
total book volumes per FTE student.
As of the start of the 1974-75 fiscal
year Ohio State had 500 volumes
available per student, more than twice
that of the next school, Cincinnati,
which had 242. Akron had 224 volumes
available, Toledo 116 and ClevelandMarshall came in eighth out of
eight with 94 volumes available per
student.
C-M v. CSU
Not only has the law library come
out last in state disbursements to
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A "meeting" is "any prearranged
discussion of the public business of
the public body by a majority of its
members." The definitions of "meeting"
and "public body" must be read
together to understand their cumulative effect. A body need not be a
"public body" to be subject to the
Act. If it includes a majority of
the members of a "public body" who
have convened to discuss the public
business of that body, the gathering
will be treated as i f it were the
"public body," legally assembled.

AND
5.

"

·~

.

In Section (A) of the new O.R.C.
121.22, the General Assembly ask~ that
their Act "be liberally construed to
require public officials to take
official action and to conduct all
deliberations upon official business
only in open meetings, unless the
subject matter is specifically
excepted by law."
The operative section of the bill,
Section ( C) , is quite short: "All
meetings of any public body are declared
to be public meetings open to the
public at all times." "Public boJy"
is defined as

4.

·. ;._

...·, ",:u£fi~4Jti\~ ~~)~~i'1\~• ,._ .'
.::-' ..£7>"1!>

THE B I LL I TSELF

1.
2.
3.
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The phrase "prearranged discussion
of the public business" includes
several elements which may appear
difficult to prove. Yet in
proceedings involving Section (H) of
the Act (discussed under the heading
"s anctions
. ") , where the validity of
public acts is challenged for
violation of the statute's procedures;
judges and juries si~ply may not
believe that meetings of three or
more members occurred by chance, or
that
a discussion of public business ,
.
if is occurred, was not intended.
Furthermore, judge or jury may be
permitted to inf er from the mere fact
of the meeting itself that public
business was considered, absent
evidence to the contrary (which may
not be believed in any event).
The expansive definition of

(From page 1)
law schools; it also follows in
disbursements to the CSU main
library. For the past two years
both libraries have received special
subsidy funds, but while the law
library's budget was cut from
$109,800 to $60,000 in 1975, the
main library's budget was cut from
$429,523 to $406,300. More
importantly, the main library has
received consistent increases in its
subscription maintenance budget
while the law library's maintenance
budget was cut $32,000 in 1975. The
materials that were listed in the
first paragraph of this article
were cancelled because of
insufficient funds in the law library's
maintenance budget.
Law students can expect one more
reduction in library services come
January, Law Librarian Bardie Wolfe
said, unless the library receives
some unlooked-for help. In
January, the library will cut its
hours of operation another 11 hours
per week because it can't afford to
pay for the staff required to keep
it open.
The budget cuts and unequal treatment of the law library raises serious
questions, at least in this reporter's
mind, as to what the State of Ohio
intends to do with Cleveland-Marshall.

"meeting" renders suspect any
informal gathering of a majority
(i.e., a half plus one) of any
governmental body.
Harmony?
The abuse the statute aims at is
the pre-meeting "ca ·us" (Algonquian,
for secret meeting),_ the members,
or enough of them, usually a
majority, to constitute a quorum
had there been a legal meeting. In
many supposedly public bodies, all
substantial decisions are made in
private. All candid discussion takes
place in private. Members work out
compromises between competing
points of view and preserve a facade
of unity for public consumption--all
in private.
The formal meetings are thus
emptied of meaning and purpose;
they become dull ritual. There is no
debate; the whole evening's business
may be put to a single vote. Blissful harmony prevails, at least in
appearance; but press and public are
no more enlightened about the
reasons behind particular decisions
than if they had stayed at home.

EXCEPTIONS
The Act expressly excepts from its
coverage several governmental bodies:
--Grand Juries
--The Adult Parole Authority "when
its hearings are conducted at a
penal institution for the sole
purpose of interviewing inmates to
determine parole or pardon."

--Certain meetings of the Ohio
Development Financing Connnission.
In addition, several other exceptions •
are implied. These include organs of
the judicial branch, notably: juries,
the deliberations of multi-judge courts,
and in camera conferences between
attorneys and judges. Three bases for
a judicial exemption can be found in
the Ohio Constitution.
(See next page)

•••

New State Sunshine Act

--Section 5 of the Bill of Rights
declares that "[t]he right of trial
by jury shall be inviolate .••• "
Implicit in the concept of the jury
is secret deliberations. A jury,
after all, is not supposed to respond
to popular pressures, except in the
most general way: that it embody and
reflect the attitudes of the
community on matters of importance.
There is surely a difference between
requiring the public taking of
evidence and requiring that judges
or jurors deliberate under the
glare of television lights in a
courtroom packed with supporters of
one side or the other.
--Article IV, Section 5(B) confers
upon the Supreme Court and inferior
courts rule-making power over
"practice and procedure." Acting
under this constitutional grant,
the courts may already have
secured the privacy of their
deliverations. (See, for example,
Civil Rules 38(a), 47(C), and 48.)
--The courts, as a coordinate branch
of government, may well possess
inherent power to regulate practice,
procedure and like matters; just as
it is sometimes said that a court
established by the constitution has
inherent power to punish for
contempt, unaided by any statute.
Certain municipal corporations,
also impliedly may be excepted. As
noted earlier, the all-important
definition of "public body" includes
every imaginable deliberative assembly
within a municipal corporation. But
under the Ohio Constitution, the
Act may not apply to charter municipalities at all. (See Beacon Journal
Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3
Ohio St. 2d 191 (1965); Dayton Newspaper, Inc., v. City of Dayton, 28
Ohio App. (2d)95(1971) affirming 23
Ohio Misc. 49 (CP, 1970).)
Considering the salutary purpose
of the Sunshine Act, perhaps the
courts should strain to make it
apply to charter municipalities,
which are, after a sizable chunk of
state government. The new Section
121.22 and municipal laws which
expressly (or by implication) allow
for secret meetings could be seen as
conflicting exercises of the "police"
power--in this case the regulation of
public morals--a conflict in which
the general state statute must prevail.
Right to See
Who would now doubt that the
conduct of government officials can
have a debilitating effect on "the
morals of the people"? Citizens
may answer the fear and arrogance
which thev believe governmental
secrecy represents with a disrespect
of their own verging on open contempt-not only for the officials personally,
but for their laws as well.

... SBA (from

page one )

The Guild's second project, at
$250, will be a newsletter to the
school and community on current
legal issues.
The Women's Caucus received
$1,520, from which $145 will pay
the expenses of their special
orientation for first-year women.
They are also planning a movie
series, at $125, and seminar on
the problems of women seeking
employment in law, at $300.
In other business, the SBA agreed
tentatively to fund $815 from its
speakers budget, for travel
expenses for Pat Anderson, who is
National Director of Community
Services for BALSA. However, a
committee of five SBA and five
BALSA members was set up to
explore alternate sources.

(From page

The decision to conduct the public
business secretly and without record
is not a matter of "organization,"
like the size of city council; still
l e ss is it a procedural matter, like
the number and length of speeches
or decorum in debate. It strikes
at the heart of popular government,
or perhaps more accurately, at its
eyes and ears. Without the ability
to see--to scrutinize official
conduct, to choose between the
c ompeting alternatives which public
debate ma y r e veal, the people are
helpless before their own officialdom.
They have surrendered their will,
p e rhaps their very lives to their
governors; and like the patient on
the ope rating table, they must hope
for the best.

EXECUTI VE SESS ION S
The term "executive session" derives
from the practice of the U.S. Senate
in considering executive business,
that is, treaties and nominations
proposed by the President of the
United States. Senate rules 36 to
39 distinguish between "open" and
"closed" executive sessions. But
under the Sunshine Act, as in common
parlance, an executive session means
a secret session. Also, unlike the
Senate rules, executive sessions
under the new 121.22 O.R.C. apply only
to deliberations, that is, to debate
upon certain sensitive subjects. The
acts of a public body, on the other
hand, must always be done in open
session, regardless of the delicacy
attending the subject matter.
Section (H) of the bi l l is quite
clear about this, as are the comments
of the Legislative Service Commission.

... Letter

(From page 2)

Fourth, Prof. Sonenfield is one
of the finest teachers in this law
school. He is always prepared to
teach, concerned that Etudents learn
and willing to give as much time
outside the classroom as a student
needs or wants. Any student in
any of his courses who has requested
held has received it.
We do not want Prof. Sonenfield's
resignation. We want him to be
allowed to return to his primary
duty and devotion--teaching the law-without continual distractions that
can serve no useful purpose to the
law school.
Cleveland-Marshall's reputation
is not enhanced when these unsubstaniated and untrue accusations are
made to the press and when the
administration dignifies the matter
with the time, procedures and
verbiage which have been devoted
to it.
Freedom of speech means more than
the right to express one's opinion.
It means the right to espouse a
controversial opinion without fear
of authoritative sanctions.
Christina s. Hartwig
Sharon Nantell
William Carrell
Robert Straus
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Executive sessions may be held to
discuss the following subjects, all
of which are strictly construed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

the appointment
employment
dismissal
OF A
discipline
promotion
demotion, or
compensation

1. public employee,
or
2. official

OR
1. public
1. the investiAGAINST
employee
A
gation of
official,
2.
charges, or
3. licensee,
2. complaints
or
4. regulated
individual

UNLESS
such person requests a public hearing.
("Regulated individuals," by the way,
include students in the public schools
and universities, as well as the
residents of state prisons, hospitals,
nursing homes, etc.)
Furthermore, executive sessions may
be held regarding:
--In certain cases, the purchase and
sale of public property.
--Conference between the public body
and its attorney concerning pending
or imminent litigation.
--Collective bargaining negotiations.
--Matters required to be kept secret
by state or federal law.
--"Specialized details of security
arrangements," where their disclosure
would aid or abet the commission of
crime. The stated purpose of this
phrase is to require that general
principles of public policy relating
to law enforcement or protection
against crime--such as the type of
weaponry in use or contemplated--be
discussed in public.

SANCTI ONS
1. Criminal Penalties. Criminal
penalties were eliminated from the
bill as adopted. However, O.R.C.
2921.44(B) doubtless applies to
violations of the Act:
No public servant shall
recklessly fail to perform a
duty expressly imposed by law
with respect to his office,
or recklessly do any act
expressly forbidden by law
with respect to his office.
Violation of this section is a
"dereliction of duty," a misdemeanor
of the second degree, punishable by
imprisonment up to 90 days or a
fine of up to $750, or both.
2. Injunctions. "Upon proof of
a violation or threatened violation"
of the Act, the Court of Common
Pleas shall issue an injunction to
compel the members of the public
body to comply ••• " Such civil
actions may be brought by "any
person." No special standing is
necessary to sue; anyone can demand
that violations of this law be
brought to a halt. Apparently,
the individual members of the
public body are the proper
defendants in the action, not the
public body as an entity. But
whether they are or not, injunctions
issued under the Act bind the
members personally.

3. Removal from office. Members
of a public body who "knowingly"
violate injunctions issued under
the Act may be removed from
office by an action brought by the
prosecuting attorney or by the
Attorney General.
4. Contempt. Since removal from
office is not mentioned as the
exclusive remedy for violations
(See next page)
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of injunctions, the courts' contempt
powers still should be available
to the party who sought the
injunction, and perhaps to others
as well. The stated purpose of
the injunctions is, after all,
to "compel" obedience to the Act.
5. Invalidation of acts. Section
(H) requires that the acts of a
public body be adopted in open
session; otherwise they are
"invalid" and may be ignored. In
addition, even if an act is done
in open session, it is invalid if
it "results from deliberations
in a meeting not open to the
public; unless the deliberations
were conducted at an executive
session for a purpose specifically
authorized" by the Act.
The precise effects of invalidation upon those dealing with
government agencies is not spelled
out in the Act--and deliberately
to allow the courts discretion to
relieve against hardship. "Hardship"
will usually involve employees,
contractors, suppliers, and others
doing business with public bodies.
Since violations of this Act are
obviously not defects which will
appear in the record, the claims
of these contractors and others will
have considerable ethical appeal.

LOOPHO LES FOR COMM ITT EES?
The Sunshine Law declares that
"all meetings of any ••• committee •.• of
a state agency, institution or
authority .•• are declared to be
public meetings open to the public
at all times." In the face of such
clear language, some at CSU nevertheless contend that the meetings of
all committees within, say, a state
· university, are not open and public.
Their argument is apparently this:
that the phrase "or similar decisionmaking body" in the definition of
"public body" relates back to the
other words, "board, commission,
committee," and limits them. Only
boards, commissions and committees
which make decisions are "public
bodies," according to this view.
Since everyone knows that most
committees and many boards make
recommendations only, they are not
"decision-making" bodies and may
therefore continue to meet in secret,
or so the argument runs. The
following points would seem to
undermine this line of reasoning.
--First of all, the plain words of
the statute spe~if ically include
"any committee ••. " True, the
sentence goes on to mention "or
similar decision-making body"; but
far from limiting the meaning of
"committee" the phrase actually
reinforces it. "Similar" to what?
"Similar" to any board, commission,
or committee. The phrase "or
similar decision-making body"
expresses the legislature's judgment
that a committee is a decisionmaking body--any committee is; and
that groups with similar functions
(but different names) are also subject
to the Act. To use a familiar
example, the phrase in Section 165(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, "fire,
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty,"
expresses the Congressional view that
such events--even the small ones--are
casualties. Had Congress used the
word "catastrophe " or "cataclysm"
instead, a fire would be no less a
fire.
--A distinction between decisionmaking and non-decision-making bodies
is obviously an important one, if
in fact it exists. Would such a
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distinction likely have been left to
implication, and placed in a
definitional section at that? I
say "implication''because the Act
nowhere mentions "non-decisionmaking" or "advisory" bodies; nor
does it even attempt to define
"decision-making body," except by
reference to boards, commissions and
committees. In short, the supposed
distinction has been pulled from
thin air.

has delegated power. These
committees may have a niche in the
organizational hierarchy, or they
may float in space, so to speak.
Whatever their station in life,
they are still "public bodies."
Why? Because they are committees
of the state institutions "of" in
the sense of "part of," "coming
from," or "within."
--As mentioned earlier, Section(A)
of the Act directs that it be
liberally construed. This means when
in doubt, open the meeting.
--Finally, Ohio Senator David L.
Headley, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee and of the sub-committee
of three which drafted the bill,
states that it was intended to apply
(and does apply) to all committees
of a state institution, by whatever
name they may be known and whatever
their function, be it decisionmaking, advisory or otherwise.

The Back Door
In light of past experience, the
legislature would have been foolish
to create yet another simplistic
either/or distinction for the
courts to grab hold of. The example
of municipal liability for wrongs
committed in a "proprietary" but not
in a "governmental" capacity comes
readily to mind and is as capricious
as any. The "decision" versus
"recommendation" distinction misses
entirely the subtlety of the
decision-making process, which inclu~~~
committees and their reports. In
addition, it invites officials to
evade the law by structuring their
processes so that all acts of
deliberative bodies are but
"recommendations" to the governing
board of an institution, which alone
can make "decisions."
Committees do, in fact, make
decisions, and every committee reference
involves a delegation of authority.
Lawyers are apt to think of "decisions"
in terms of court decisions; but
"decision" has another meaning more
appropriate to non-judicial bodies,
that is, simply a "conclusion" upon
a given matter. In this sense,
committees do make decisions upon the
subjects submitted or entrusted to
them. These decisions are called
reports; and they affect the parent
assembly's thought and action in
important ways, whether they are
ultimately adopted or not.
The term "public body" retains a
core of meaning quite apart from the
specific examples given in the
definition, exhaustive though they
attempt to be. The very purpose of
these examples is to decrease
vagueness and increase precision, but
all of them attempt to answer the
question: what is a "public body"?
It is important here to
distinguish between the two types of
committees an observer will likely
encounter within a state institution.
First, there are the committees of
such admittedly "public bodies"
as the governing boards of state
institutions. A committee of a
public body is itself a public body.
What else could it be, a private
body?
But there are often a host of other
committees within an institution
which are not established by
resolution of the governing board
and do not report to it. Instead,
they are appointed by officials or
groups to whom the governing board

Moot Court Results
Cleveland-Marshall placed third
in a field of twelve schools at
the recent 1975 Region VI Moot
Court Competition, held in Cleveland November 5 - 7.
With two teams representing each
school, Ohio State finished first.
Cleveland-Marshall lost its bid
for second place in a semi-finals
match with Case.
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Notes

&
f"bVIES

Briefs

CSU Film Society

A Chump at
Oxford
Venom

11:00 Nov. 21
8:00 Nov. 28
10:30
29
Call 687-3800 for further information.
CWRU Film Society

Little Colonel
Brief Vacation
Harold & Maude

7:00 Nov. 25
9:30
6:00 Nov. 29
8:00
10:00
7:00 Dec. 2
9:30

CWRU Images of Women Series

A Doll's House

Dec. 7

Call 368-2463 at CWRU for entertainment information.

SPECIAL EVENTS
Ramsey Clark

Tuesday, Nov. 25 at noon in the
Law Student Lounge. Topic: "The
Law: An Effective Instrument for
Social Change." No admission
charge. The public is invited.

GENERAL
Photographs of Graduating Seniors

Wed., Nov. 26: Make-up day
1:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m., Room 0076
(SBA Office).
Deadline for Locker Registration

Nov. 26. Locks will be removed
from all unregistered lockers
and locker contents taken to
the Security Department.
New York Times Subscriptions - Winter
Quarter

Dave Miller, Room 1057, during
exam week. $10.00 per quarter,
checks or money orders payable
to C.S.U.
Course Selection Adjustment

Dropped:
Workmen's Legislation
Protection (1681, Sec. 25)
Added:
Motion Practice (L644, Sec. 25,
3 credit hours, Call No. 4548,
M,W,Th. 2:00-2:50, Prof. Browne)
Faculty Meetings

Friday, · Dec. 12
Room CB 2062, 3-5:00 p.m.
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